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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DOCKET #34516 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, 
vs. 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
Garry W. Jones, Jones, Brower & Callery, P.O. Box 854, Lewiston, ID 83501, 
Paul T. Clark, Clark and Feeney, P.O. Drawer 285, Lewiston, ID 83501 
TRANSCRIPT OF APPEAL 
Appealed from District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County o f  Clearwater 
Honorable John R. Stegner, District Judge Presiding 
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PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
CLARK and FEEMY 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-95 16 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN 1 
) Case No. 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 
VS. ) COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE 
1 
KELLY A. DIJNAGAN, 1 
) 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * *  
Plaintiff alleges: 
Plaintiff is now and for more than six weeks last past has been an actual bonafide resident of the 
State of Idaho. ,- 
11. 
The parties hereto were married at South Lakea Tahoe, Nevada, on May 29, 1999, and ever since 
said date have been and now are husband and wife. 
111. 
No children have been born as the issue of this marriage 
COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE -1- 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 8356 0 0 0 
v. 
The defendant owns several items of separate property all which should be confirmed unto him. 
VI. 
During the marriage the parties have acquired various items of community property and have 
1 incurred community debts. 
8 
9 
Il WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays as follows: 14 
VII. 





II 1. That a decree of this Court be entered dissolving the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore 15 
have arisen which are so deep as to be irreconcilable and irremediable and render it impossible for the parties 
to continue together as husband and wife, which conflicts will be set fonh on order of the Court, or upon 
hearing of the matter. 
l6 I1 existing between the plaintiff and the defendant, and granting to the plaintiff an absolute divorce from the 
19 11 3. By said decree the Court confirm unto the defendant his separate property; 
17 
18 
20 ll 4. That by said decree the Court make an equitable division of the community property of the 
defendant; 
2. By said decree the Court confirm unto the plaintiff his separate property; 
21 parties and provide for the payment of the community debts; and I1 
5.  For all other just relief. 
COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE -2- 
LAW OFFlCEE OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 835 O O O O [  
FROM :RGcKY MTN CONT FRX NO. :3073672749 Rug. 03 2005 05:07PM P4 
I 
OB-uo-ZOOB 07:8le~ FIOPCLARK~FEENEY 12087468160 7-534 P.D03/003 F-504 ,I 
,2005. 
CLARK: and FEFNEY 
STATEOFmMO 1 
)se. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
CBlW M. DIJNAOAN, king fmt duly sworn on onth, deposes and says: 
That he i s  the Plaintiff wmtl in the foregoing Complaint; that heha red thcfc*e.&oing inscmmwr 
know$ theconmn hereof and tho facts sratedrberein uretrue to the best ofher knowledge, information md 
belief. 
M. I ~ A U  
S m S m E D  AND to bfore this lday of'!&$&& 
-. 
, 2005. 
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho 
Residing at- 
My Commission expires: 
COMPLAINT liOR IiIVORCE -3- 
CLARK AND PBBNBY 
LEWIETDN. IDLHO 88601 I 
r, ,-.- ,. 
b . , :j7 &5-:3&,f, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICI" 'CI I "~  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER . 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
....... a v - A  _ EEP!!T 
) 
) Case No. CV 05-00324 
) 
1 
) MUTUAL TEMPORARY 
) RESTRAINING ORDER 
) Re: property and debt 
Defendant. 
The parties having entered into a Stipulation for Temporary Restraining Order Re: Property and 
Debt, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDEWD, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parties 
shall be restrained and enjoined during the pendency of this action or until further order of this court 
from damaging, selling, mortgaging, encumbering, secreting, removing, hiding, transferring or other 
wise concealing any of the assets and/or money of the parties and from incurring any debt, other than 
cvd day of August, 2005. DATED this ___ 
J ~ G E  
14 11 for ordinary and normal living expenses. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i3 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the a d a y  of August, 2005,I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of tbe foregoing document by the method indicated be!ow, and addressed to thr. following: 
I 
, ( _ , ., I .. 
CLERK OF THE COURT . , .. . , :. . 
LAW OFFICES ?F 
CLARK AND F'EENEY , ..,' 
':>. 
Mr. Ganry W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Box 285 
1229 Main Street, Ste 201 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
(' . . .  . . .... . . . . . . . . .  




@' U.S. Mail 
I3 Hand Delivered 
tl Oveinight Mail 
tl Telecopy 
,.*.? -.--.L 
,Ice . ,., " . 
<*, . , , ........ 
...:.... 2 . "  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlSTRlC 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER , !I, /2;;5 Cyi .-5 !.>\ 1 ! .  J ,-; e. 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, ) . .  
) 
.... . . ,  : . .  .: & V ~ V O S - ~ ~ &  .. ,,; ; , 







1 ORDER SETTING TRIAL 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter is set for Court 
Trial in the Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Clearwater, at Orofino, Idaho, on January 27. 2006 
beginning at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: 
1. A Settlement Conference will be held on January 18. 2006 
beginning at the hour of. 3:30 p.m. 
2. Discovery should be initiated so that all responses are due no later 
than 15 days prior to trial. 
3. Pursuant to ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(h), parties are 
to file with the Court and serve upon all opposing counsel, or upon 
parties not represented by counsel, 30 days prior to trial, a list of all 
exhibits to be offered at trial and a list of names and addresses of 
all witnesses which such party may call to testify at trial. 
4. Each party hereto file with the Court exhibits to be used as 
evidence during the trial one week prior to the trial date. Plaintiffs 
exhibits shall be entitled "Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1," etc., and 
defendant's exhibits shall be entitled "Defendant's Exhibit A," etc. 
Said exhibits shall be accompanied by a statement that counsel 
has produced for examination by the other party all exhibits to be 
introduced for examination by the other party all exhibits to be 
introduced into evidence, and a list of such exhibits shall be 
attached containing a brief description thereof. Each party should 
prepare sufficient copies of documentary evidence to provide 
copies for opposing party to the Court in addition to the original. No 
exhibits will be permitted at trial other than those described and 
listed and filed pursuant to this order except when offered for 
impeachment purposed or when permitted by the Court in the 
interest of justice. 
5. Each party file a statement by January 18, 2006 containing: 
a. A statement that all answers or supplemental answers to 
interrogatories or admissions reflect all facts known to date. 
b. A concise statement of issues of law remaining for trial. 
c. A concise statement describing the issues of fact remaining for 
trial. 
d. A list of all community personal property and the values at which 
said party would offer to sell or buy each item. 
e. A proposal for division of community property and debts. 
f. A list briefly describing all exhibits proposed or offered by any 
party, which can be admitted into evidence without objection 
and those exhibits to which only an objection as to relevance or 
materiality will be raised. 
g. A statement or listing of any evidentiary questions anticipated at 
the time of the trial. 
h. Authorities and briefs in support of the party's position on any 
evidentiary questions or issues of the law. 
Randall W. Robinson - Magistrate 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
d%l I hereby certify that on this 5day of October, 2005 true copies of the 
foregoing Order Setting Trial and Discovery was mailed: 
Garry W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ldaho 83501 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ldaho 83501 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN 
Garry W. Jones 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
1304 Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-3591 
Idaho State Bar No. 1254 
ZOO5 DEC I4  P 3: 14 
Cfi,SE NO ?,[,:(5,?>%\ , 33? 
I 
BY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICJAL. DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
CI-ZRIS M. DUNAGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
Defendant. 









Upon stipulation of plaintiff and defendant in Clearwater County case numbers CV 2005 
- 00324 and CV 2005 - 0033 1, it is hereby ordered that said cases be consolidated for hearing, 
with the complaint filed by KELLY A. DUNAGAN under Case No. CV 2005 - 00331 being treated 
in all respects as if it were an Answer & Counterclaim in Case No. CV 2005 - 00324, with said 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN being known in all future actions as the defendant and counter-plaintiff. 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
IT IS IGREBY CERTIFY that the undersigned is the (Deputy) Clerk of the above entitled 
Court; that on the day of December, 2005, the undersigned enclosed a certified copy of the 
Order to Consolidate, to which this Certificate is attached, issued by the above entitled court in the 
above entitled action, in an envelope addressed to: 
GARRY W. JONES PALJL TI-IOMAS CLARK 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. CLARK & FEENEY 
P. 0. BOX 854 P. 0 .  BOX 285 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 LEWISTON, ID 83501 
which are the present and last known addresses reported to the undersigned by Gary W. Jones; 
placed the necessary postage thereon, and deposited the same in the iJnited States Post Office. 
nii' 
DATED this&. daypf December, 2005. 
', 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT #fJRN -b A s: 2 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWA b~d5 32q/ 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, ) ::!\SE !.lG 
) Case No. CV 05-00324 
Plaintiff, 1 BY P D E P u i  
) 
vs. ) ORDER Re: Motion to Compel aud ORDER 
) VACATING TRIAL 





The above-captioned matter having come on regularly and duly for hearing before the undersigned I 
Judge of the above-entitled Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial and Motion to Compel; the I 
Plaintiff, Chris Dunagan, having appeared by and through his attorney of record Paul Thomas Clark; the I 
Defendant, Kelly Dunagan, having appeared by and through her attorney of record Gany Jones; and the I 
Court being fully advised, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant I 
Kelly Dunagan shall provide full and complete answers to Plaintiffs Interrogatory Nos 2 and 3 and provide I 
a depreciation schedule in response to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents. Said discovery shall I 
be provided to Plaintiffs attorney on or before January 18,2006. I 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial presently scheduled for January 27,2006, is VACATED I 
and reset for Court trial to commence on TUESDAY, MARCH 21,2006, at 9:00 a.m. /. 1 
DATED This ay o 
HONORABLE RANDALL ROBMSON 
ORDER -I 
w w  OFFICES OF Q08QO 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
" 411 I hereby certify on the 
day of January, 2006, a hue CODY . . 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: Mailed 
____ Faxed 
- Hand delivered 
- Overnight mail to: 
5 
7 
U W  OFFICES 0 OOB[Bkg 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
IEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
Mr. Gany W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box854 




Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Box 285 
1229 Main Street, Ste 201 











/I Judge of the above-entitled Court; plaintiff having appeared by and through his attorney of record, Paul 13 
r:<;?;~ ,. . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECONDXUDICIAL DISTRI 
STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 




v. ) ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL 
1 






Thomas Clark, defendant having appeared by and through her attorney of record, Garry Jones, the Court 
14 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel having come on regularly and duly for hearing before the undersigned 
/I having heard arguments of counsel and being fully advised; 15 
16- ll NOW, TI-IEREFORE, ITIS HEREBY ORDERED, that the defendant is ordered to prepare and serve 
l7 il Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Second Set of Lnterrogatories and Request for Production of Documents 
18 11 and Request for Admissions to Plaintiff by March 14,2006 - 
19 / /  DATED t h i s l g d a y  of March, 2006 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 ;. 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. :OAHO 8350: 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,&p I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of March, 2006, I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document by the method lndlcated below, and addressed to the following: 
/ 
OF THE COURT 
Mr. Garry W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Box 285 
1229 Maln Street, Ste 201 
Lew~ston, ID 83501 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 
Cd U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy (FAX) 
d U.S Ma11 
Hand Dehvered 
D Ovemlght Mall 
Telecopy (FAX) 
LAW 0 F F G . S  YFo 08 0 0 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
CLARK and FEENEY 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-95 16 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
CIfRIS M. DUNAGAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
Defendant 
1 
) Case No. CV 05-00324 
? 
) 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION 
) DUCES TECUM -Kelly Dunagan 
1 . . . .  
) ~gga;:~, 2806, at :9,:00. a.*.j 
1 
l4 I1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the unders~gned attorney for Plamt~ff w~ l l  take testimony on oral 
l5 I1 examinabon of KELLY A. DUNAGAN, before Linda Carlton, Certified Court Reporter, Court Reporter 
16 11 for the State of Idaho, on April 7,2006, at 9:00 a.m. ofthat date and thereafter from day to day as the taklng 
17 11 of the deposison may be adjourned at the office of Paul T o m s  Clark, 1229 Mam Smet,  Lewxton, Idaho, 
l8 I1 at which place you are invited to appear and take part in the examination as you may deem advisable and 
1 proper. 
i YOU ARE FURTHER NOTLFIED that this deposition is being taken duces tecum pursuant to Rule 
34, and the deponent is required to produce the following documents: 
I. All writings and instruments of whatsoever nature showing all receipts and also all 
expenditures of any sums of money by you for the last three (3) years, including, but not 
limited to, checkregisters, checkstubs, canceled checks, bank statements, receipts, billings, 
whether paid or unpaid, ledger or account books, bank passbooks for savings or other 
accounts, and every other written instrument or thing of whatsoever nature whether 
hereinabove specif~cally mentioned, in any way relating to any sums of money received or 
expended by you for the preceding three (3) years. 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM -1- 
uw OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
Copies of all deeds, mortgages, closing statements and all other documents dealing with the 
purchase or sale of any real property by you during the last ten years. 
Bank statements, ledgers or account books, bank passbooks for any savings accounts and 
checking accounts held in your name for the last three (3) years. 
Stock certificates, bonds and evidences of title to any and all property now in your name or 
the name of nominees for your account. 
Loan agreements, notes, repayment schedules and all other documents dealing with loans 
secured in your name, on which you are presently indebted. 
All financial statements including balance sheets and profit and loss statements for each of 
the last five years, together with any copies of financial statement provided to any lending 
institutions or financial institution for the purpose of securing credit or any other purpose 
during said five year period. 
All bank statements, ledgers or account books, bank passbooks for any savings accounts and 
checking accounts held in your name only for the last three (3) years. 
.\I1 I Y ~ I I ~  5tnlcments, ledgers or account books. ba~ikpassbook.; tbi any snvln&:s ct<coilnts and 
chccklng accounts held !n both thc l!la~ntit'iand Dct'c11dant's name\ for thc last three (3) 
years. 
Documentation on payment made on the debt of the Krystal Cafi from January 1, 1999 to 
the present, including but not limited to the source of the funds used to pay the debt. 
Example, the Defendant made, among others, a $20,000 lump sum payment in 2005. The 
source of and documentation of the funds used to make that payment is requested 
Copies of all bank statements, ledgers or accounthooks, bank passbooks for any savings and 
checking accounts for the Krystal Cafk from January 1, 1999 to the present. 
Copies of ail investment statements including DRA's, CDs or investments of any kind made 
by you from January, 1999 to the present. 
12. Copies of your daily account booWaccounting journal for the Krystal Cafe from January, 
1999 to the present. 
DATED This 2 day of March, 2006. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM -2- 
- - 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of March, 2006, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Gany W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
U.S. Mail 
I& Hand Delivered 
O Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM -3- 
LAW OFFECES OF D O O Q o  
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlST 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW 
?:>A$ i:'" " i '  
,. ,Ju , ,;!+ :? 3 !?, 7: 5 i 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, 1 / 
) , :> .. ._ : , . ,~. .., [;@clfg -1 "';324/ . . 
plaintiff, ) CASE NO. ~~2005-00'00324 
) , , . , , .- .-. . . 
) 
". ... - . ,. 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter is set for court trial in the 
Magistrate Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County 
of Clearwater, at Orofino, Idaho, on APRIL 26 and 28,2006 beginning at the hour of 9:00 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: 
1. A Status Conference will be held on April 19, 2006 beginning at the hour of 
8:30 a.m., to be conducted by telephone. Plaintiffs counsel shall 
initiate the conference call. 
2. Discovery should be initiated so that all responses are due no later than 15 
days prior to trial. 
3. Pursuant to ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(h), parties are to file 
with the Court and serve upon all opposing counsel, or upon parties not 
represented by counsel, 30 days prior to trial, a list of all exhibits to be 
offered at trial and a list of names and addresses of all witnesses which such 
party may call to testify at trial 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL - 1 
4. Each party hereto file with the Court exhibits to be used as evidence during 
the trial one week prior to the trial date. Plaintiff's exhibits shall be entitled 
"Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1," etc., and defendant's exhibits shall be entitled 
"Defendant's Exhibit A," etc. Said exhibits shall be accompanied by a 
statement that counsel has produced for examination by the other party all 
exhibits to be introduced for examination by the other party all exhibits to be 
introduced into evidence, and a list of such exhibits shall be attached 
containing a brief description thereof. Each party should prepare sufficient 
copies of documentary evidence to provide copies for opposing party to the 
Court in addition to the original. No exhibits will be permitted at trial other 
than those described and listed and filed pursuant to this order except when 
offered for impeachment purposed or when permitted by the Court in the 
interest of justice. 
5. Each party shall file a statement by April 19.2006 containing: 
a. A statement that all answers or supplemental answers to interrogatories 
or admissions reflect all facts known to date. 
b. A concise statement of issues of law remaining for trial. 
c. A concise statement describing the issues of fact remaining for trial. 
d. A list of all community personal property and the values at which said 
party would offer to sell or buy each item. 
e. A proposal for division of community property and debts. 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL - 2 
f. A list briefly describing all exhibits proposed or offered by any party, 
which can be admitted into evidence without objection and those exhibits 
to which only an objection as to relevance or materiality will be raised. 
g. A statement or listing of any evidentiary questions anticipated at the time 
of the trial. 
h. Authorities and briefs in support of the party's position on any evidentiary 
questions or issues of the law. 
Dated this %day of March, 2006. 
&A%& 
I-/ - V 
Randall W. Robinson -Magistrate Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of March, 2006 true copies of the foregoing 
Order Setting Trial and Discovery was hand delivered or mailed, postage pre-paid, to: 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
Garry W. Jones 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN 
Clerk of the District Court 
B ~ : '  
ORDER SETTING TRIAL - 3 
- 
. . .  , -, 
> ..*.I c,rtr\:.; .:<.:,.,;.!'i 
,';j;{-c{Sl'Riii i:(jijRT 
:.Pu!ATF 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF I%E 
STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATEK I 
!':;b ),::.!; 73 ?: I,!.'# 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN 1 ,.," .,., ,.-.. , .. 




KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
j INTERLOCUTORY DE~&E-OF- . -  . . - -  1 




'The parries having appeared before the undersigned judge of the above-entitled Court; plaintiff I 
having appeared in person and by and through his attomey of record, Paul Thomas Clark; Defendant having I I/ appeared in person and by and through her attomey ofrecord, Gassy W Jones; the parties having entered into 
9 I 
cestain stipulations; and the Court having considered the stipulations of the parties and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, based thereon, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
I. 
The bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between plaintiff and defendant he and the 
same are hereby dissolved and the parties are hereby granted an absolute divorce from the other on the 
grounds of irreconciIable differences. 
IS. 
Defendant's name is hereby changed to Icelly A. Kircher. 
111. 
If Defendant continues to reside in the family home and/or continues to occupy the commercial 
property where her business (Crystal Caf6) is located, Defendant shall make the payments on said properties 
and shall receive credit for any principal 1-eduction on the indebtedness thereon from March 21, 2006, 
forward. 
n/. 
The trial on the remaining issues regarding property and debt will be held on Wednesday, April 26, 
2006, at 9:00 a.m. and continuing on Friday, April 28, 2006, at 9:00 a.m. at the Clearwater County 
Courthouse in Orofino. Idaho. 
INTER1,OCUTORY DECREE OF DIVORCE -1- LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENM 0 0 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
9 2, 
DATED this " day of 
CERTIFICATE O F  SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of / ,2006, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Mr. Gany W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 -. 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Box 285 
1229 Main Street. Ste 201 
INTERLOCUTORY DECREE OF DIVORCE -2- 
U.S. Mail d Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 




L(\W OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
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W THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, 1 
) Case No. CV 2005-324 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MEMORANDUM OF 
VS. ) AUTHORITIES 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
i 
Defendant. 
l5 I/ COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Chris M. Dunagan, by and through Paul Thomas Clark, Clark 




20 11 The par01 evidence rule provides that when a contract has been reduced to a writing that 
and Feeney, his attorney of record, and submits, pursuant to this Court's request, the following 
Memorandum of Authorities. 
21 I/ the parties intend to be a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any prior or 
25 




contemporaneous agreements or understandings which relate to the same subject matter is not 
admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms of the written contract. Simons v. Simons, 134 
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I1 the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed, m d  parol evidence, that is, 
1 
documentary, oral or real evidence extrinsic to the deed itself, is not admissible to ascertain 
intent. Id. at 828, 11 P.3d at 24 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Hall v. Hall, I16 
Idaho 483,486, 777 P.2d 255,258 (1989) (Where the deed names both spouses, as husband and 
wife, the same parol evidence showing a separate interest necessarily varies the deed and is barred 
by the parol evidence rnie.j 
It is well established that when community funds are used to enhance the value of one 
aid the trial court in determining the intent of the drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists. Id. 
at 828, 11 P.3d at 24 (citation omitted). If the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous 
lo 1 spouse's separate property, such enhancement is community property for which the community 
l 1  /I is entitled to reimbursement, nnless such funds used for enhancement are intended as a gift. 




l6 I1 omitted). In situations where a spouse's equity in property has been increased through the 
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 460, 80 P.3d at 1061 (citations omitted). Community funds spent to 
reduce the principal of a mortgaged indebtedness on one spouse's separate property retain their 
l9 11 460, 80 P3d at 1061 (citation omitted). 
17 application of community funds to the payment of debt on the property, the measure of 
reimbursement to the community should be the amount by which such equity is enhanced. Id. at 
20 
21 
The measure ofthe reimbursement for community expenditures on separate property is the 
22 
23 
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increase in value of the property attributable thereto, not the amount or value of the community 
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reimbursement to the community canies the burden of demonstrating that the community 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 2 
expenditures have enhanced the value of the separate property, and the amount of the 
enhancement. Id. at 460, 80 P.3d at 1061 (citation omitted). 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE BARS THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY PAROL 
EVIDENCE REGARDING ANY INTENT TO TRANSFER INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY BECAUSE THE QUITCLAIM DEED'S LANGUAGE IS PLALN 
AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
In this case, the Defendant is attempting to introduce evidence that contradicts the plain 
and unambiguous language of the quitclaim deed to establish that she did not intend to transmute 
her separate property interest in the house into community property when she executed said deed. 
As set forth above, such evidence is barred by the parol evidence rule 
The Defendant transmuted any separate property interest she had in the home to a 
l2 li community interest when she signed and executed the quitclaim deed. Said quitclaim deed 
l3 11 satisfies the statutory requirements regarding conveyances ofreal property (See I.C. 5 55-601) and 
14 // satisfies the statutory requirements of1.C. 3 32-917. Furthermore said deed is unambiguous. All 
l5 11 of the statutory formalities are met and the deed clearly states that the interest in the subject 




20 1 been established by the Plaintiff with clear and convincing evidence, though the plain and 
property is being transferred to the Plaintiff and Defendant, as husband and wife. As such, the 
applicable law requires that the intent must be ascertained from the deed itself and any parol 
21 11 unambiguous language of the quitclaim deed, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court 
22 !I hold that when the Defendant executed said deed, any separate property interest was transmuted 
26 I1 MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 
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The Defendant has cited in support of her position Hoskinson, supra. However an 
II examination of that case shows it offers no support for the Defendant's position. In that case there 1 I 
were two quitclaim deeds, regarding the plaintiffs separate property house, signed and notarized I 
on the same day. 139 Idaho at 459,80 P.3d at 1060. One deed conveyed the defendant's interest I 
4 //  to the plaintiff and the other deed conveyed the plaintiffs interest to the plaintiff and defendant I 1 as husband and wife. id. at 459, 80 P.3d at 1060. The defendant claimed that the deed to I 




establish that the plaintiff intended to make a gift to the community and the Court also noted that I 
"husband and wife" transmuted the plaintiffs property from separate to communily property. Id. 
at 459,80 P.3d at 1060. The Court held that the defendant failed to prove a trmsmi~taticn by clear 
l1 / /  the evidence did not establish whether the deed to the plaintiff and the defendant was signed I 
l 2  1) before or afier the deed to the plaintiff i d  at 459-60,80 P.3d at 1060-61. 1 
l5 I1 same day, and that deed's language is plain and unambiguous thus the parol evidence rule I 
13 
14 
prohibits introduction of parol evidence in ow case. See Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 175,898 I 
In our case there is only one deed, not two conflicting deed's signed and executed on the 
I7 11 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1995) (Plaintiff should not be allowed, by extrinsic evidence, to contradict the I 
l8 11 plain language of the deed and claim he never really intended to convey the land). Said deed is ( 
l9 11 clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant intended to transmute the property interest into I 
22 11 B. THE COMMUNITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT. 
20 
21 
23 I1 The community is barred from reimbursement for community funds spent on the plaintiffs 




separate property debt if the defendant failed to show that the community expenditures have 
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enhanced the value of the separate property and the amount of the enhancement. 
A 
DATED thi& day of June, 2006. 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorney6 for Plaintiff 
-23 
I hereby certify on t h e 2  
day of June, 2006, a trne copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: - Mailed 
- Faxed 
A Hand delivered 
Mr. Gany W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I & ~ -  - - 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLWRWATER 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, ) CASE NO. CV 2005-00324 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
) 





This matter came before the court on June 20, 2006. A trial was conducted with 
the parties present and Paul Thomas Clark representing the Plaintiff and Garry Jones 
representing the Defendant. Based upon the Memorandum Opinion and Decision 
entered in this case, Judgment is entered as follows: 
The Plaintiff is and was a bona fide resident of the State of Idaho and has been a 
resident for more than six (6) weeks preceding the filing of his complaint. 
This Court has jurisdiction to determine the divorce and the property and debt 
distribution. 
An interlocutory divorce was entered between the parties on March 25,2006 with 
property and debt issues resewed for the trial that took place on June 20, 2006. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED: 
1. The bonds of matrimony between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were 
dissolved on the grounds of irreconcilable differences , and the Defendant awarded an 
absolute decree of divorce from the Plaintiff on June 20, 2006. 
2. The property and debts of the parties shall be divided as set forth in Exhibit A, 
annexed hereto, with the addition that the Plaintiff shall receive a copier from the 
Page 1 - DECREE OF DIVORCE 
80000027 
Defendant. The parties will sign all necessary papers effectuating the transfer of their 
interest in the property that is assigned to the other party except for the Crystal Cafe 
property, as discussed below. 
3. The Defendant shall have sixty (60) days to make an equalization payment to 
the Plaintiff of $108,500. Upon payment in full of the equalization payment $108,500 
within said sixty (60) days, the Plaintiff will sign over and release to The Defendant ail 
interest in the Crystal Cafe. If The Defendant does not make the equalization payment 
within the prescribed time, the Crystal Cafe will be put up for sale in a commercially 
reasonable manner. The Plaintiff and The Defendant will list the Crystal property with 
an agreed upon realtor. If the parties cannot agree, upon filing of a Motion, this Court 
will select a realtor. The Defendant may continue to use the property until sold for her 
business. The Defendant shall keep the business in presentable condition in order to 
ensure its value for purposes of selling. The Defendant is responsible for paying 
expenses associated with the property such as water, sewer, garbage, power, and loan 
payments. Furthermore, the Defendant is to cooperate with the real estate personnel in 
all aspects in the sale of the property. Neither party will withhold consent to any 
reasonable offer. 
-T' 
Id DATED this /% b a y  of k- ,2006 
/ 
Magistrate Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage '' 4.9 2.006, to the following: prepaid, on the &day of 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Garry W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk 
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description 
1) Krystal Cafe bldg 
2) Krystal Cafe bus. 
3) Krystal Cafe bank acct 
4) Grand Ave house 
5) wife's retirement acct 
6) husb. retirement acct 
7) w. smathers loan 
8) 2005 tax ret.-wife 
9) Zion's bank acct 
10) Orofino C.U. acct 
11) Lewis-Clark C.U. acct 
12) Am-West Kelly/Sherrill 
13) Bank of Latah -wife 
14) Steve Lyman prints 
15) B of A bank acct-husb. 
16) 2005 GMC Denali 
17) oak bedroom set 
18) couch 
19) N & stand 
20) fridge 
21) Kelly's diamonds 
22) bedding-before marriage 
23) utensils-before marriage 
24) oak table &chairs 
25) comforters 
26) computers 
27) her office desk 
28) recliner 
29) freezer 
30) stove-wife's before mart. 
31) washldry-wife's before 
32) stereo-wife's before 
33) outdoor furnlBBQ-wifes 
34) coffeelend tables 
35) microwave 
36) 2003 Bayliner boat 
37) DVDlsurround sound 
38) lawn mower 
39) camcorder 
40) 2005 Dodge P.U. 
41) flatbed trailer 
42) guns 
43) bucket truck 
44) gun safe 
45) recliner 
46) telecomm. equip 
47) tools 
48) fishinglcamping gear 
49) drift boat-husb. before 
50) lawn mower/weedeater 
51) 32' travel trailer 
value 
236.500 
debt equity to wife to husband 
39594.64 196,905.36 196,905.36 
52) lamp 
53) husband's VISA 
54j taxes dispute -4500 -4500 
totals 536,573 151334.33 208,087.03 295,713.92 78480.23 
Equalization Payment 708,500 108,500 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLZRRWFR - 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS . 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
Defendant. 
1 , . q',g ! &--QE43Cy', 
) CASE NO. CV2005-00324 
j 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION 





This case involves the distribution of debt and property between the 
parties incident to divorce. An interlocutory divorce was granted on March 23, 
2006. A trial was conducted on June 20, 2006 regarding the distribution of 
property and debt. Paul Thomas Clark represented the Plaintiff, Chris M. 
Dunagan ("Dunagan"), and Garry W. Jones represented the Defendant, Kelly A. 
Dunagan (Kircher) ("Kircher"). Dunagan, Kircher, Terry Rudd, Jeff Roberts, and 
Carmen Coty testified at the trial. Exhibits were admitted into the record and 
considered. Also considered was a Memorandum submitted by Dunagan a week 
after the trial on the parole evidence rule and the parties' Pretrial Statements. 
This Court has jurisdiction as both parties have resided in Idaho at least 
six weeks prior to the filing of their actions. 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF FACT 
The parties married on May 27,2000. They separated in 2005. An 
interlocutory divorce was entered on March 23, 2006. 
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Prior to marriage, Kircher operated the Crystal Cafe. On July 24,2000, 
the parties acquired the present site of the Crystal Cafe. $80,000 of the $90.000 
purchase price was financed through the Bank of Latah. Both Kircher and 
Dunagan were placed upon the title to the Crystal Cafe. Shortly after purchase, 
part of the land adjoining the Crystal Cafe was sold. 
The Crystal Cafe was gutted out. Massive repairs were performed. 
Dunagan alleged putting in 2000 hours of work. Kircher testified she put roughly 
2000 hours into the renovation of the site and credibly asserted that Dunagan 
could not have put in that much time. The Crystal Cafe did not open at the new 
site until October I, 2001. 
On November 24,2003, the residential property owned by Kircher was 
refinanced through Zions Bank. As a condition of the refinancing, Kircher 
quitclaimed her interest in her home to "Kelly Dunagan and Chris Dunagan, wife 
and husband." The quitclaim is a form document with the name of Zions Bank on 
the lower right hand corner. The quitclaim signed by Kircher was filed by Zions 
Bank with the Clearwater County Recorder. Over Dunagan's objection based on 
the parole evidence rule, Kircher testified that she signed lots of papers at the 
closing and did not know that she was giving up any interest in her home to 
Dunagan. Kircher also testified that she would not have signed the form had she 
understood she was giving an interest in her property to Dunagan. $20,000 from 
the proceeds from the loan was used to pay off a secured loan on an RV, 
separate property owned by Dunagan. Proceeds were also used to pay an 
unsecured debt owed by Kircher to her prior spouse. 
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At the time Dunagan and Kircher entered into marriage, they orally agreed 
that they would keep their finances separate. During their marriage, Dunagan 
and Kircher kept their finances separate. Kircher paid all the insurance and 
payments on the house and her business. Dunagan gave Kircher $500 on two 
occasions. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Uneven Distribution. 
Kircher argues that an uneven distribution of property and debt should be 
issued in her favor. Kircher alleges the existence of an oral agreement between 
her and Dunagan that the parties would keep their property separate and that 
their actions corresponded to that agreement. Kircher paid all the taxes, 
insurance and house payments on the real properties during the marriage. The 
time of cohabitation during the marriage of Kircher and Dunagan was not very 
long, approximately five years. Kircher requests an uneven distribution of the 
property based upon this oral agreement and that the home and her business, 
the Crystal Cafe be awarded to her. 
ldaho Code 3 32-917 requires that "all contracts for marriage settlements 
must be in writing, and executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as 
conveyances of land are required to be executed and acknowledged or proved." 
The ldaho Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of full compliance 
with ldaho Code § 32-917 before an agreement is recognized: 
One of the major purposes for requiring life-changing documents to 
be written and executed is to impress upon the parties the 
importance of the legal consequences of the document. For 
example, prenuptial agreements and wills must be written, signed, 
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executed, and acknowledged. See I.C. § 32- 922; I.C. 5 15-2-502. 
Dividing the property of a community that may have lasted for 
decades has consequences at least as important as distributing the 
assets of the deceased. Indeed, the process of drafting an 
agreement often shows the parties that they omitted major issues 
or made hasty assumptions while negotiating. In addition, the 
requirement of writing and execution substantiates that the parties 
actually did come to a meeting of the minds in a vitally important 
area. 
Stevens v. Stevens, 135 ldaho 224, 229, 16 P.3d 900, 905 (2000). 
Kircher recognizes the unenforceability of an oral agreement under ldaho 
Code § 32-917, but argues that the circumstances surrounding the oral 
agreement and the parties' adherence to the agreement constitute compelling 
circumstances, permitting an uneven distribution of property and debt. 
"Generally, community property will be divided in a substantially equal manner 
unless there are compelling reasons which justify otherwise. I.C. § 32-712(1); 
Rice v. Rice, 103 ldaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982)." Maslen v. Maslen, 121 ldaho 
85, 88, 822 P.2d 982, 985 (199q). Kircher's argument must be rejected. 
First, to recognize an oral agreement as a compelling circumstance does 
violence to the legislative scheme. The parties had ample opportunity to comply 
with the statute and sign a proper prenuptial or postnuptial agreement if that was 
their intention. The failure to do so does not provide a compelling reason to 
ignore the statute requiring a written agreement. 
ldaho Code 3 32-912 sets forth a list of non-inclusive factors that can be 
considered in determining whether a division shall be equal. Besides the oral 
agreement, the only factor argued was the duration of the marriage. However, 
this factor alone does not constitute a compelling reason to set aside the 
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substantially equal division of assets. In Maslen v. Maslen, 121 ldaho 85, 87, 
822 P.2d 982, 984 (1991), the ldaho Supreme Court upheld the magistrate's 
finding that a short troubled marriage in which a regular living pattern was never 
established did not provide a compelling circumstance for an uneven distribution. 
Generally, to show compelling need, hardship is the most important factor. 
Thus, an unequal division was upheld on the basis that "Bill, as a profoundly 
disabled person, probably unemployable and saddled with ongoing expenses 
related to his condition, required a greater share of the community property to 
support himself." Hentges v. Hentges, 115 ldaho 192,195,765 P.2d 1094, 
1097 (Ct.App. 1988). See also Brazier v. Brazier, I I I ldaho 692,697,726 P.2d 
1143, 1148 n. 2 (Ct.App. 1986) ("(T)he court may deviate from equality in order 
to alleviate hardship."). Kircher has failed to show the type of hardship 
contemplated by the statute to constitute compelling circumstances and thereby 
justify deviating from the normal rule of a substantially equal division of property 
and debt. 
B. Division of the Property and Debt. 
The parties' property and debt is divided in accordance with the spread sheet 
annexed hereto as Exhibit A. An explanation of the rationale for the division is 
provided as follows. 
1. Item 1 : Krystal Cafe 
The parties agree the Krystal Caf6 building is owned by both parties and 
that the building and debt should be assigned to Kirchner. The parties differ on 
the value of the building. 
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Dunagan relies upon an appraisal performed at his request by Terry Rudd, 
an appraiser for over forty years. Mr. Rudd's report submitted a restricted use 
report which cannot be used as the basis for a loan. Mr. Rudd testified that he 
would have performed additional research if intended for use to determine loan 
eligibility. He estimated that the additional research could increase or decrease 
the appraised value by five to ten percent. 
Mr. Rudd used two methods to calculate the fair market value of the 
building. He did not use the income approach because he did not have access 
to the earnings of the Cafe. Mr. Rudd used the market and cost method. Mr. 
Rudd conceded each approach has its problems. 
The market approach relies upon reviewing comparable sales. The seven 
sales used by Mr. Rudd included four sales from 2003. Two sales were from 
Orofino including a lawyer's office, and three sales were of restaurants in 
Lewiston. Mr. Rudd came up with a square footage price and multiplied it by the 
size of the premises. 
The cost approach takes into account the original price and cost of 
repairs. The cost approach is normally greater than the market approach. This 
is especially so in this case as both the original cost and the cost of the repairs 
are inflated. While Mr. Rudd used the original cost of the sale, he was not aware 
that a part of the original parcel had been sold off. 
Secondly, Dunagan exaggerated the number of hours put into the project, 
just as he exaggerated the value of the items he seeks to assign to Kircher. 
Dunagan testified that he put 2000 hours into rebuilding the Cafe. Mr. Rudd 
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assigned $25.00 an hour to his efforts. Kircher credibly testified without rebuttal 
that Dunagan had spent long periods of time away at his work and that he never 
performed work when she was not there. Under the most liberal interpretations 
of Kircher's testimony, she put in 2000 hours of effort. Therefore, Dunagan could 
not have put in that number of hours that he attributed to his efforts. Mr. Rudd 
testified that even adjusting for these two factors, his estimate would not be 
affected by much. As a contractor, Mr. Rudd thought $176,500 represented a 
fair value for the repairs which he assigned under the cost method. 
Using the cost method, the value of the Crystal Cafe came to $256,500. 
The market value came to $236,500. Mr. Rudd gave the market value twice the 
value of the cost method in arriving at his final appraised value of $241,500. Had 
the income method been used, Mr. Rudd would have given three times the value 
to the market value, two times to the income value and one value for the cost 
method. 
Kircher estimated a value of $150,000, but gave no facts to back up her 
estimate other than relying upon the value of the place when purchased and the 
slow state of the market. Kircher testified that she was aware of two commercial 
places that had been up for sale for quite some time. Despite the length of sale, 
Kircher testified that the price for one of the places, the bowling alley, had even 
recently increased. 
Mr. Rudd conceded that it would take time to sell the Crystal Cafe. Mr. 
Rudd opined it could take six months to two years to sell the caf6; with an 
auction, the property could be sold after four months of preparation. 
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An appraisal is not an exact science. However, Mr. Rudd has been in the 
appraisal business, as noted, for more than 40 years. He has sold homes. He 
has constructed homes and other buildings as a contractor. He was secure 
enough in his estimate to say that he would pay the price that he came up with. 
Based upon Mr. Rudd's expertise, his opinion must be given great weight. Mr. 
Rudd's methodology is far more reliable in establishing the fair market value of 
the Cafe than Kircher's guesswork. 
The market value of $236,500 will be used as the fair market value. Given 
the small market in Orofino, exact comparable sales are not going to occur. Mr. 
Rudd credibly testified that the sample businesses he used gave a fair 
approximation of the fair market value. 
The market approach is adopted as a better measure of the fair market 
value rather than using Mr. Rudd's hybrid method in which the cost method is 
utilized to arrive at the final fair market value. The cost method, while usually 
high, came in even higher than to be expected given its failure to take into 
account the sale of part of the property and its reliance on the amount of work 
Dunagan allegedly put into the building. In addition, another appraiser, Carmen 
Coty, testified that she does not use the cost analysis when the sale has taken 
place more than five years prior. In this case, the sale took place more than five 
years ago. As Mr. Rudd made clear, the practice of combining the values of the 
market approach and the cost method is not required by his profession. The 
impact of using solely the market approach will have little impact and be well 
within the range of 5 to 10% deviation to the fair market figure that could occur 
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with additional information. Given the circumstances, the cost method is better 
applied as a guidepost and not an appropriate measure of the fair market value. 
2. Item 2: Caf6 Equipment 
With respect to the restaurant equipment, Dunagan argues all the items 
listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 16 which are purchased after the date of marriage 
should be valued at their tax cost. There are several problems with Dunagan's 
argument. 
First, Dunagan commits the same error in appraising the value of the 
equipment as he does in valuing many of the disputed items he assigns to 
Kircher. The tax cost Dunagan urges as the value of the items represents the 
purchase price. Kircher credibly testified that kitchen equipment dramatically 
reduces in value. Kircher sold a dishwasher she never used for $1000 that she 
purchased for $5800. Kircher's accountant, Jeff Roberts, testified the tax cost 
does not necessarily have anything to do with the fair market value. For 
example, she bought entire, used kitchen equipment from a restaurant for 
approximately $6000 in 2000. She now assigns half the value to the equipment 
more than five years after purchase. The value after tax depreciation is 
approximately one-quarter of the value of the equipment. 
Second, Dunagan ignores not only that items such as the dishwasher no 
longer exist, but also seeks to double count items by counting them both in the 
personal property calculations and also the restaurant business. As explained by 
Kircher, she incorrectly listed some personal items as assets of the cafb for tax 
purposes. Thus, one of the propane stoves listed at item 43 on Plaintiffs Exhibit 
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16 is personally used and considered in valuing the home. A computer, listed on 
Defendant's Exhibit A as item 26, also appears as item 47 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 16. 
Kircher has purchased $34,210.08 of items for the restaurant during the 
marriage to Dunagan excluding the dishwasher. Deducting the propane stove 
and the computer yields $31,329.83 of purchases. 
There are several values given to the purchase of the restaurant 
equipment, none of which is entirely satisfactory. As discussed, Dunagan's value 
using the purchase cost is decidedly too high. Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 represents to 
the Clearwater County Assessor that the value of the entire personal property at 
the restaurant as $6109. The inventory does not appear to include all the items 
owned by Kircher. 
The tax depreciation value assigned to the items purchased after marriage 
is $4966.03. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16. On the one hand, this figure seems too small 
as it only assigns $1559.83 to the equipment purchased in 2001 that Kircher 
assigns as having the value of roughly $3100. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
project a value as much as $7333.20 to the carpeting. Thus, the depreciated 
value is appropriate to use as the value for the older equipment, but not the 
newer purchases since 2002 which have no tax net book value. 
The best measure for the value of the items may well be the sale of the 
dishwasher which sold for less than one-fifth its value, even though not used and 
not retained as long as most items on the list. Taking into account the sale of the 
dishwasher, the depreciated value appears to be the closest to the market value, 
Conceding that the depreciation schedule may seek to represent a faster 
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acceleration in the value than what the market would normally bear, the 
depreciated value in this case comes closer to the true value than cost when 
purchased. 
The depreciated value will only be used for the equipment purchased 
during 2001. For more recent items, Kircher has assigned a value of $500 to 
item 55 and $200 to item 52 which amount to roughly one-half the original cost. 
These values will be accepted given Kircher's expertise in purchasing and 
valuing restaurant equipment and one-half the cost will be assigned as fair 
market value to the remaining items purchased since 2002. The total amount of 
the equipment purchased during the marriage excluding the computer, one of the 
propane stoves, the dishwasher and the copier is $9649.99. 
As a non-essential item to the business, Dunagan will be awarded the 
copier. Dunagan sets the value of the copier as $1475.08 and so this value will 
be adopted. Deducting for the value of the copier, Kircher's equipment will be 
valued at $8174.91. This value comports with the value of the restaurant 
equipment attributed to Kircher just prior to her marriage to Dunagan. Prior to 
her marriage to Dunagan, Kircher estimated her purchases of restaurant 
equipment between 1994 and 2000 to be worth $9840. Plaintiffs Exhibit 36. It 
can be expected that the initial purchases would consist of essential items that 
would retain their value more than later purchases. 
3. Item 3: Krystal Cafe Savings Account 
With respect to item 3, Kircher argues that she should be credited with a 
separate property interest of $10,232, the amount of money she alleges in the 
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account at the time of marriage. Dunagan concedes that tracing is proper. 
However, Dunagan argues that Kircher has failed to meet her burden in proving 
the separate character of the property because of months in which no bank 
records were introduced to show the amount of' money in the account. Dunagan 
also argues that the account dropped below the amount at the time of marriage. 
The "party asserting the separate character of property must prove the 
property is separate with reasonable certainty and particularity." Weilmunsfer v. 
Weilmunsfer, 124 Idaho 227, 234, 858 P.2d 766, 773 (Ct. App.1993). "However, 
our Supreme Court has stated that 'a requirement of showing that community 
funds were exhausted at the date of purchase of each disputed asset, imposes 
too heavy a burden of record keeping on the average spouse.' Speer, 96 ldaho 
at 131, 525 P.2d at 326." Id. at 238. Although not producing all the bank 
records, Kircher has shown with reasonable certainty and particularity a separate 
property interest in the amount of $8,062.06. $8,062.06 is the amount of the 
Latah Bank account on the date of the marriage on May 27,2000. The bank 
account has had greater funds than $8062.06 since then. 
Dunagan argues that the fact that the accounts in June 2003 and March 
2003 are missing means that Dunagan cannot show her separate property 
interest sufficiently. The test is whether the separate property interest can be 
identified with reasonable certainty, not absolute exactitude. Kircher need not 
produce all the records. In the months before and after March 2003 and June 
2003, the account never dipped below $18,534.93. Since then, the funding level 
of the account has been persistently above that amount. The present value that 
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both agree on of $22,368.23 is far in excess of the $8062.06. A review of the 
records does not disclose any large deposits or withdrawals, but very regular 
deposits and withdrawals reflecting the restaurant business. The $8062.06 is 
remote, 70 months prior to the date of the interlocutory divorce. The accounts for 
several years have not dipped much below $20,000. Kircher has met her burden 
even though Defendant's Exhibit B does not show the amounts in the account for 
the months of March 2003 and June 2003. 
Kircher also did not provide bank account statements after December 
2005. Again, there is no suggestion that the accounts dipped anywhere close to 
$8062.06 from January 2006 through the date of the interlocutory divorce of 
March 23,2006. 
Kircher has met her burden in establishing with reasonableness and 
particularity her separate property interest in the amount of $8062.06. Thus, the 
community property interest will be assigned as $14,306.17. 
4. Item 4: The Home 
The parties do not dispute the appraised value of $125,000 for the home. 
I find the testimony and report of the licensed appraiser, Carmen Coty, to be 
persuasive and adopt $125,000 as the fair market value of the home. 
The parties differ as to the amount of community interest in the home. 
Kircher denies that a legal quitclaim she signed granting her and Dunagan a 
community property interest in the home is effective. 
Kircher testified that she was not aware that the papers Zions Bank gave 
her in obtaining a loan to purchase the restaurant gave any interest in the home 
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to Dunagan. She testified that she would not have signed the loan if she had 
known that the loan involved giving Dunagan an interest in the home. Dunagan 
objected to this testimony as in violation of the parole evidence rule. 
There are three appellate cases addressing the parole evidence rule in the 
context of deeds. First, in Ha l  v. Hall, 116 ldaho 483, 484, 777 P.2d 255, 
256 (1989), the Supreme Court held that testimony from the parents was 
inadmissible under the parole evidence rule that the parents intended to gift to 
their son the value of the property that exceeded the agreed upon price. The 
testimony contradicted the unambiguous language in the deed that the entire 
value of the property was transferred to the son and his wife. 
In Bliss v. Bliss, the husband claimed that he had gifted his interest in the 
land to his wife solely to avoid a tax lien. The Supreme Court held that the 
husband failed to overcome the presumption of separate property. The Supreme 
Court rejected the use of the husband's testimony as in contradiction to the 
unambiguous language in the deed and emphasized, "The policy considerations 
underlying the rule in Hall and similar cases, as well as the statute of frauds, are 
welt founded and enduring." The Court approvingly cited an earlier case in 
noting that 
(t)he statute was enacted to guard against the frailties of human 
memory and the temptations to litigants and their friendty witnesses 
to testify to facts and circumstances which never happened. 
Experience had convinced both jurists and lawmakers that the only 
safe way to preserve and pass title to reat property is by a written 
conveyance subscribed by the grantor. The beneficial effects of this 
statute would be desfroyed if a grantor could come in years 
afterwards and submit oral testimony to show that the conveyance 
was nof infended as an absolute grant but was only infended to 
creafe a trusteeship in the grantee. Dunn v. Dunn, 59 ldaho 473, 
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484, 83 P.2d 471, 475-76 (1938) (emphasis added, citations 
omitted). Likewise, Gordon should not be allowed, by extrinsic 
evidence, to contradict the plain language of the deed and claim he 
never really intended to convey the land. The magistrate correctly 
ruled that evidence regarding the parties' intent and conversations 
when the deed was executed was inadmissible to contradict the 
deed. We find no error in the magistrate's determination that 
Gordon failed to rebut the statutory presumption of separate 
property. 
Bliss v. Bliss, 127 ldaho 170, 175, 898 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1995). 
Finally, in Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, as here, a spouse argued that "he 
signed the quitclaim deed simply because the lender presented it to him during 
the loan closing, that he signed it along with many other papers the lender 
presented to him, and that he had no intent to transmute his property into 
community property." Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448, 459-460, 80 P.3d 
1049, 1060 - 1061 (2003). In Hoskinson, the Supreme Court held that the 
spouse failed to prove a "transmutation by clear and convincing evidence. T k  
evidence did not establish that Reed intended to make a gift to the community." 
Id. at 460. 
Hoskinson is distinguishable from this case. The court in Hoskinson was 
faced with two quitclaim deeds regarding the same real property signed on the 
same date and filed at different times. The wife granted her interest in the 
property to her husband in one quitclaim. In the other quitclaim, the husband 
deeded his interest in the real property to both the wife and himself. "The 
evidence did not establish whether the deed to Reed and Elizabeth was signed 
before or after the deed to Reed." Id. The identical date on the two deeds 
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created the ambiguity necessary to permit testimony as to the intent of the 
parties. 
In this case, there is no ambiguity. The deed is unambiguous in providing 
that Kircher "do hereby convey, release , remise, and forever quit claim unto 
Kelly Dunagan and Chris Dunagan, wife and husband" the home at issue. In the 
absence of any ambiguity or fraud, the parole evidence rule prevents testimony 
that differs from the unambiguous language of the quitclaim deed. Thus, 
Kircher's testimony that she did not intend to convey any interest in her home to 
Dunagan is rejected under the parole evidence rule. The entire value of the 
home is treated as an asset of the community. The home and debt associated 
with the home will be assigned to Kircher. 
5. Agreement of the Parties. 
I have adopted the values and the designations as to who should receive 
the property and debt as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit A 
with the exception of the aforementioned copier. I have also adopted the values 
and designations the parties stipulated to during the trial which are as follows: 
ltem 8: The parties agreed at trial that the value of the income tax return of 
$2309 should be awarded to Kircher. 
ltem 14: The parties agreed at trial that the value of the Lyman prints 
retained by each of the parties offsets each other's value. 
ltem 20: The refrigerator will be assigned to Kircher at a value of $300 by 
agreement of the parties. 
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Item 36 The 2003 Bayliner Boat will be assigned to Kircher at a value of 
$13,000 along with the debt. 
7. Disputed items. 
Unless otherwise stated, the values of the items Kircher assigned to the 
items allocated to her have been adopted as the values. Kircher purchased the 
items and so has a better idea than Dunagan as to their value. Furthermore, I do 
not find Dunagan's valuations to be credible. Dunagan admitted he used the 
new value or the purchase value for items 20, 21,24,25, 34, 35, 37, and 39. 
Each of these items he assigns to Kircher. Items he assigns to himself do not 
reflect the new or purchase value. ltem 43, a bucket truck, is assigned a much 
depreciated value as compared to the Yukon vehicle assigned to Kircher. 
Leaving aside liquid assets whose value is readily determinable and the three 
items which they wish to assign to each other, Dunagan grossly inflated the value 
of items he assigned to Kircher. Dunagan was able to agree with Kircher in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 prior to trial only as to the value of a freezer and computer of 
the many items of personal property he assigned to Kircher. This contrasts with 
Kircher who used the purchase cost as the value twice for items assigned to 
Dunagan and agreed with Dunagan on the valuation for more items assigned to 
Dunagan than assigned to her despite Dunagan being awarded far less items. 
ltem 15: Dunagan testified he had $4700 in his bank account at the time 
of trial. However, the key date for valuation is the date of the interlocutory 
divorce. In light of this date, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 uses the balances of all other 
accounts prior to March 25,2006. Dunagan offered no reason why item 16 
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should be treated any differently. Thus, $6000 as agreed to on Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1 and Defendant's Exhibit A shall be used as the value. 
ltems 17,18, and 19: The parties agree as to the value, but differ as to 
who should receive the items. Dunagan purchased the items, but does not feel 
he has room to store the items. The lack of a place to store the items is not a 
reason to force their sale upon Kircher who does not wanf fhem. The ifems will 
be assigned to Dunagan. 
Item 21 is assigned to Kircher as her separate property. Even Dunagan 
testified the jewelry was a gift. 
ttem 4 1 and 43: Dunagan's values are closer to fair market value than 
Kircher who used the purchase cost of the items, so Dunagan's values will be 
adopted as the fair market value. 
ltems 42 and 46: Kircher testified that Dunagan had purchased guns and 
telecommunications equipment during their marriage that are not reflected in 
Dunagan's valuation of the items. Kircher's suspicions may be well-grounded. 
Despite virtually no contributions for the house payments, Dunagan, upon 
questioning, could not explain where his salary went. However, Kircher was 
unable to identify one specific item that was purchased in addition to the items 
and values listed. Therefore, Kircher failed to meet her burden to show any 
different value than the value posited by Dunagan who has a great deal of 
expertise in the area of the value of guns and telecommunication devices. The 
values attributed by Dunagan for his guns and telecommunications equipment 
will be adopted as the values for purposes of distribution of property and debt. 
Page 18 - MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION 
Dunagan suggested at trial that Kircher has hidden $6000 of cash. 
Kircher admitted to hiding assets in a prior divorce. Half of the discrepancy was 
explained by Kircher's odd method of bookkeeping which jumped around in 
dates. The alleged discrepancy could be explained by the use of a money order 
or certified check. I do not find that Dunagan has shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Kircher has hidden any assets, 
Kircher's request for attorney fees as set forth in item 51 I in Defendant's 
Exhibit A is denied as no evidence was adduced showing financial need and 
thereby entitlement to attorney fees under ldaho Code § 32-704(3). 
7. Reimbursement to the Community. 
Item 50: Kircher seeks reimbursement to the community of $20,000 for 
payment in November 2003 on a 32 foot travel trailer owned by Dunagan 
(W)hen community efforts, labor, industry, or funds enhance the 
value of separate property, such enhancement is community 
property for which the community is entitled to reimbursement. The 
measure of reimbursement for community expenditures on 
separate property is the increase in value of the property 
attributable thereto, not the amount or value of the community 
contribution. 
Martsch v. Martsch, 103 ldaho 142, 147,645 P.2d 882, 887 (1982). 
There was no testimony or evidence regarding the value of the travel 
trailer at the time of the payoff in November 2003. The value of the trailer was 
$25,000 on June 28, 2000. Plaintiffs Exhibit 15 at 1000578. The amount owing 
on the trailer on June 28, 2000 was $20,000. Id. It is too remote in time to 
extrapolate from November 2003 to June 28, 2000 to derive a value that was 
enhanced by the payment made on the RV. 
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Dunagan requests reimbursement to the community of the proceeds of a 
loan that were used to pay off unsecured debts owed to Kircher's first husband. 
However, no reimbursement is permitted for payments on antenuptial unsecured 
debts. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172-173, 898 P.2d 1081,1083 -1084 (1995). 
8. Equalization Payment 
Dunagan is entitled to an equalization payment of $108,500. Kircher will 
be granted sixty (60) days from the date of this decision in which to make this 
payment. If Kircher makes such payment in full within said sixty (60) days, 
Dunagan will sign over and release to Kircher all interest in the Crystal Cafe. If 
Kircher does not make the equalization payment within the prescribed time, the 
Crystal Cafe will be put up for sale in a commercially reasonable manner. There 
is no other property available to pay Dunagan his equalization payment. 
Dunagan and Kircher will list the Crystal property with an agreed upon 
realtor. If the parties cannot agree, this Court, upon filing of a Motion, will select 
a realtor. Kircher may continue to use the property until sold for her business. 
Kircher shall keep the business in presentable condition in order to ensure its 
value for purposes of selling. Kircher is responsible for paying expenses 
associated with the property such as water, sewer, garbage, power, loan 
payments, etc. Furthermore, Kircher is to cooperate with the real estate 
personnel in all aspects in the sale of the property. Neither party will withhold 
consent to any reasonable offer for the Cafe. 
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CONCLUSION 
The parties' assets and debts will be distributed as set forth in Exhibit A, 
annexed hereto, consistent with this Memorandum. The Crystal Cafe will be sold 
in a commercially reasonable manner as discussed above if the equalization 
payment is not made within sixty (60) days of this Order. The parties will sign all 
necessary papers effectuating the transfer of their interest in the property that is 
assigned to the other party. 
DATED this @ d a y  of July, 2006&& y& 
Randall W. Robinson 
Magistrate 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OPINION 
/a fl" AND DECISION was mailed, postage prepaid, this 2day of July, 2006, to the 
following: 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Garry W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
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description value debt equity to wife 
1) Krystal Cafe bldg 236,500 39594.64 196,905.36 196,905.36 
2) Krystal Cafe bus. 8174.91 8174.91 
3) Krystal Cafe bank acct 14,306.17 14,306.17 
4) Grand Ave house 125,000 58,921.36 66,078.64 
5) wife's retirement acct 10.254.52 10.254.52 
6) husb. retirement acct 18,386.23 
7) w. smathers loan 22,244 
8) 2005 tax ret.-wife 2,309.00 
9) Zion's bank acct 2,926.99 
~ b )  orofino C.U. acct 
11) Lewis-Clark C.U. acct 745.77 
121 Am-West KellvtSherrill 2,585.41 
to husband 
13j Bank of ~ataG- wife 
14) Steve Lyman prints 
15) B of A bank acct-husb. $6.000 
6000 
16) 2005 GMC Denali 29,000 28.877.39 122.61 122.61 
17) oak bedroom set 7500 
7500 
1000 1000 18) couch 
19) TV & stand 900 
900 
20) fridge 300 300 
21) ~eliy's diamonds 
22) bedding-before marriage 
23) utensils-before marriage 
24) oak table & chairs 
25) comforters 
26) computers 
27) her office desk 
28) recliner 
29) freezer 
30) stove-wife's before marr. 
31) washtdry-wife's before 
32) stereo-wife's before 
33) outdoor furntBBQ-wifes 
34) coffeelend tables 
35) microwave 
36) 2003 Bayliner boat 
37) DVDtsurround sound 
38) lawn mower 
39) camcorder 
40) 2005 Dodge P.U. 
41) flatbed trailer 
42) guns 
43) bucket truck 
44) gun safe 
45) recliner 
46) telecomm. equip 
47) tools 
48) fishinglcamping gear 
49) drift boat-husb. before 
50) lawn mowertweedeater 
51) 32' travel trailer 
52) lamp S 
53)husband's VISA -3000 -3000 
54) taxes dispute -4500 -4500 
totals 536373 151334.33 208,087.03 295,713.92 78480.23 
Equalization Payment 108,500 108,500 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County User: VICKY 
Minutes Report j.j *--,,:-. i5-..!,'::i.i: 
Case: CV-2005-0000324 
Chris M Dunagan vs. Kelly A Dunagan 
Selected Items 
Hearing type: Motion to Reconsider 
Assigned judge: Randall W. Robinson 
Court reporter: 
Minutes clerk: VICKY 
Minutes date: 08/07/2006 
Start time: 11:04AM 
End time: 11:21 AM 
Audio tape number: CD181 
Parties: Dunagan, Chris; Clark, Paul 
Dunagan. Kelly; Jones, Garry 
Tape Counter: 1104 Honorable Randall Robinson presiding. Attorney Tom Clark present, via telephone, 
representing the Plaintiff. Attorney Garry Jones present, via telephone, representing the 
Defendant. 
Tape Counter: 11 04 Court notes Mr. Jones is correct. Decree should be nunc pro tunc back to date of 
Interlocutory Divorce. Also notes Mr. Jones is requesting the legal description of the real 
property in items 1 & 4 to be included. Mr. Clark has no objection. Court will grant. 
Tape Counter: 11 05 Mr. Jones advises just wishes to clarify some points. 
Tape Counter: 11 05 Court on item #3 believes it should be Ms. Dunegan's responsibilty for the expenses of the 
Krystal Cafe building in event she closes the business prior to sale of the building. It is her 
building and has all rights of ownership. 
Tape Counter: 11 06 Mr. Jones argues. 
Tape Counter: 1107 Court advises it will be her choice whether to close the business before sale. 
Tape Counter: 1108 Mr. Clark agrees with CouKs position. 
Tape Counter: 1108 Mr. Jones inquires re expenses of sale and equalization payment. 
Tape Counter: 11 08 Court clarifies expenses associated with the sale should be split between the parties and 
come out of the shares that have been attributed to the people. 
Tape Counter: 1109 Mr. Jones inquires re the equalization payment and taking the shares out, should be 
adjusted to reflect actual proceeds into the formula. Discussion with Court. 
Tape Counter: 11 13 Court reluctant to allow a latter adjustment based upon a possibly latter change in market 
conditions. 
Tape Counter: 11 15 Mr. Clark agrees with Court. 
Jape Counter: 11 15 Mr. Jones argues &further discussion with Court. 
Tape Counter: 1120 Mr. Clark will stand on the record. 
Tape Counter: 1121 Court will review the matter further and will issue a new Decree of Divorce. 
1 Tape Counter: 1 12 1 Court in recess. 
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KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 1 ORDER TO AMEND DECREE OF 
) DIVORCE 
Defendant. ) 
The Defendant requests clarification of this Court's Decree of Divorce 
entered on July 17, 2006, in five respects. 
First, the Defendant requests that the Decree of Divorce be clarified that the 
Decree of Divorce be established as March 21, 2006, the effective date of 
interlocutory Decree of Divorce. This request will be granted. The Decree of 
Divorce will be amended to reflect the date of March 21,2006 as the date of 
divorce. 
Second, the Defendant requests that the legal descriptions of the real 
property be included in the Decree ofDivorce. This request will be granted. 
Third, the Defendant requests clarification of the responsibilities of the 
Defendant as to the payment of expenses associated with the Krystal Cafe building 
in the event she closes her business prior to the sale of the building. In essence, 
the Defendant requests a contribution from the Plaintiff to maintain the building 
should she cease her business. The Defendant's request for such relief is denied. 
The Defendant is awarded the business and the building. The building is 
only sold should the Defendant fail to make the equalization payment. It is up to 
ORDER TO AMEND DECREE 
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the Defendant as to whether she wishes to operate her business or use the building 
for other purposes such as rental. It is inequitable for the Defendant to keep all the 
benefits to herself from the building without any payment to the Plaintiff while she 
operates the business, but burden the Plaintii with the costs should the Defendant 
choose to cease operating her business. The Amended Decree is modified to 
clarify this point. 
Fourth, the Defendant requests that this Court clarify the responsibility for 
sale expenses, including, but not limited to any real estate commissions. The 
Defendant's request is granted. The reasonable expenses directly incurred by the 
sale of the building, such as the sales commission, will be equally borne by the 
parties. One-half of the reasonable expenses directly associated with the sale of 
the building will be deducted from the equalization payment Plaintiff is due of 
$108,500. 
Fifth, the Defendant requests clarification of the division of the net proceeds 
should they not equal the equity contemplated by the Court. At the argument, the 
Defendant requested that the amount of equalization vary according to the actual 
amount that the property sells for. The Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives 
both the Defendant and the Plaintiff an equal stake in the sale. Despite such 
appeal, I deny the Defendant's request. 
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at the time of the Decree 
based upon the fair market value of the property at the time of the divorce. 
Brinkmeyerv. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596,600,21 P.3d 918 (2001). As noted by 
the Supreme Court, "Any community asset may change in value after the division 
ORDER TO AMEND DECREE 
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of the community. This is not a reason to modify the division." Ross v. Ross, 117 
Idaho 548, 554, 789 P.2d 1139 (1990). The Plaintiff should not be penalized by 
the Defendant's actions while controlling use of the building or by the vagaries of 
the market. By fixing the equalization payment, this Court is removed from 
becoming intimately involved with the Plaintiffs actions or inactions in controlling 
the building since the date the value was established. Also, the Defendant has 
alternatives to selling the Cafe such as by selling her own home andlor by loans. 
The Defendant argues she believes the business to be only worth 
$150,000.00 and so the Plaintiff will receive a windfall in obtaining a 
disproportionate value from the sale of the building. The Defendant at the trial 
failed to offer any evidence to support her subjective belief as to the value of the 
building other than anecdotal stories about two local properties that had not sold 
quickly. The appraiser's value was adopted, a value which the appraiser said he 
would pay for the property. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's request for clarification that an Amended Decree of Divorce 
be issued is granted with respect to the dating of the divorce back to March 25, 
2006, the legal description of the property be set forth in the decree, and that. the 
reasonable expenses associated with the sale be explicitly split between the 
parties. The Defendant's request to clarify the divorce is denied in other respects. 
DATED this day of August, 2006. d d@g~-;  (/ Y ~ b % ~  
RANDALL W. ROBINSON 
Magistrate 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, on the 3.1",\ day of August, 2006 to: 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Garry W. Jones 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Deputy 
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This matter came before the court on June 20, 2006. A trial was conducted with 
the parties present and Paul Thomas Clark representing the Plaintiff and Garry Jones 
representing the Defendant. Based upon the Memorandum Opinion and Decision and 
the Order to Amend Decree of Divorce entered in this case, Judgment is entered as 
follows: 
The Plaintii is and was a bona fide resident of the State of Idaho and has been a 
resident for more than six (6) weeks preceding the filing of his complaint. 
This Court has jurisdiction to determine the divorce and the property and debt 
distribution. 
An interlocutory divorce was entered between the parties effective on March 21, 
2006 with property and debt issues resewed for the trial that took place on June 20, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED: 
1. The bonds of matrimony between the Plaintiff and the Defendant are 
dissolved on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the Defendant awarded an 
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absolute decree of divorce from the Plaintiff nunc pro tunc to March 21,2006, the 
effective date of the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce. 
2. The property and debts of the parties shall be divided as set forth in Exhibit A, 
annexed hereto, with the addition that the Plaintiff shall receive a copier from the 
Defendant. More specifically, with respect to the real property, the Defendant shall be 
awarded the real property at 12350 Grand Avenue, Orofino, ldaho with the legal 
description of ""Lots 6, 7, and 8, Block 2, Day's Addition, according to the recorded plat 
thereof, records of Cleatwater County, Idaho." The parties will sign all necessary 
papers effectuating the transfer of their interest in the property that is assigned to the 
other party except for the Krystal Cafe property, as discussed below. 
3. The Defendant shall also be awarded the real property upon which the Krystal 
Cafe is located at 130 Johnson Avenue, Orofino, Idaho with the legal description of 
"Lots 7 and 8, block 2, Day's Addition, according to the recorded plat thereof, records of 
Cleatwater County, Idaho" upon payment to the Plaintiff of an equalization payment of 
$108,500. The Defendant shall have sixty (60) days to make the equalization payment 
to the Plaintiff of $108,500. Upon payment in full of the equalization payment of 
$108,500 within said sixty (60) days, the Plaintiff will sign over and release to the 
Defendant all interest in the Krystal Cafe. If the Defendant does not make the 
equalization payment within the prescribed time, the Krystal Cafe will be put up for sale 
in a commercially reasonable manner. The Plaintiff and the Defendant will list the 
Krystal Cafe property with an agreed upon realtor. If the parties cannot agree, upon 
filing of a Motion, this Court will select a realtor. The Defendant shall cooperate with the 
real estate personnel in all aspects in the sale of the property. Neither party will 
withhold consent to any reasonable offer. The Defendant may continue to use the 
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property until sold for her business or for any other purpose consistent with reasonable 
use of the building including rental. The Defendant shall keep the building in 
presentable condition in order to ensure its value for purposes of selling. The 
Defendant is responsible for paying expenses associated with the property such as 
water, sewer, garbage, power, and loan payments. Furthermore, the parties shall share 
equally the reasonable expenses directly associated with the sale. The equalization 
payment will be reduced by the Plaintiff's one-half share of the reasonable costs directly 
associated with the sale that are not paid by him prior to the sale. 
DATED this 2 d d a y o f  $ 5  ,2006 
Randall W. Robinson, 
Magistrate Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on the day of ki~!&a* 2006, to the following: 
;i
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Garry W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
OBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk 
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) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
1 Fee Category: R(l)(c) 
1 Fee Amount: $53.00 
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COMES NOW, KELLY A. DUNAGAN, defendant, by and through her attorney of record, 
GARRY W. JONES of the law oMices of JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C., and pursuant 
to Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby appeals from the Amended Decree of Divorce 
dated August 25,2006, entered by the Honorable Randall W. Robinson. 
I .  The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of the 
District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Clearwater. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
2. The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Cleanvater. 
3. The date and heading of the judgment(s) ftom which the appeal is taken is the entry 
of the Amended Decree of Divorce dated August 25,2006. 
4. The appeal is taken upon both matters of law and fact. 
5. The testimony and proceedings of the hearing was heard on June 20, 2006. All 
proceedings were recorded by audio tape by the Cleanvater County Clerk's office. The Clerk of the 
court, District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Cleanvater, is in possession of the reported record of these proceedings. 
6. Issues on appeal: 
a. Whether the Court erred in determining that the defendant 
transmuted her home Eom her separate property to community 
property. 
b. Whether the Court erred in failing to award an unequal distribution 
of property in favor of the defendant. 
c. Whether the Court erred in requiring the defendant to continue to 
be responsible for the condition of property ordered by the Court 
to be sold and further requiring the defendant to be responsible for 
paying all expenses associated with the property such as water, 
sewer, garbage, power and loan payments. 
d. Whether the Court erred in failing to reallocate sale proceeds fTom 
the sale of the Krystal Kafe building in the event the sale price of 
said building is less than the $196,906.36 equity contemplated by 
the Court. 
e. Whether the Court erred in failing to find the existence of an 
agreement between the parties that they would keep all of their 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -2- 
respective property acquired prior to mamage, as their sole and 
separate property during their marriage. 
7. It is hereby requested pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83G) that the appeal 
be heard as an appellant proceeding and that transcripts be prepared as provided by Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 83(k). 
A x  
DATED this 1 day of October, 2006. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorney for &&ant, KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I KEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was this& day of October, 2006, 
- hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
- hand-delivered; + mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
- transmitted via facsimile 
- transmitted via e-mail 
to: 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
CLARK & FEENEY 
THE TRAIN STATION, SUITE 201 
1 3TH & MAIN STREETS 
P.O. DRAWER 285 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
Attorney for bkendant 
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1 
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) 
KELLY DUNAGAN, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF WANO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
l9 11 Pursuant to Rule 83(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as Rule I1 of the Idaho 
l7 
18 
20 ( Appellate Rules, notice is hereby given that: 
TO: KELLY DUN;~GAN AND HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD GARRY JONES, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
1. This appeal is taken from the magistrate's division of the above-entitled court. 
2. This appeal is taken to the district court of the above-entitled court. 
3. This appeal is taken from the Memorandum Opinion and Decision entered July 17, 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL -1- 
25 
26 
L A W  Q*r!Ge5'0 0 0 0 0 0 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
2006; The Honorable Randall Robinson presiding. 
I1 LEWISTON. lOAHO 83501 I 
LAW OFFICES Qssosa 
CLARK AND FEENEY 


















4. This appeal is taken upon matter of law and fact. 
5. The testimony and/or proceedings of the original trial were recorded and are in the 
possession of the Clearwater County Clerk. 
6. The issue of appeal is: Did the magistrate err in the manner in which he valued the 
community property of item 41 on Exhibit A? 
-t" 
DATED This @ day of October, 2006. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
BY 
I hereby certify on the - )A* 
day of October, 2006, a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: Mailed 
- Faxed 
- Hand delivered to: 
Mr. Gany W. Jones 
Jones, Brower & Callery 
P.O. Box 854 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
- COURT MINUTES - 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: June 6,2007 
Jodi M. Stordiau 
Court Reporter 
Recording: J: 3/2007-06-06 
Time: 1:28 P.M. 






1 Plaintiff/Respondent represented by 
IGLLY A. DUNAGAN KERCHER, 1 Paul Thomas Clark, Lewiston, ID 
) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Defendant/Appellant represented by 





Subject of Proceedings: APPELLATE ARGUMENT 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for hearing appellate 
argument in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel. 
Mr. Jones argued on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Clark argued on behalf of the 
respondent. Mr. Jones argued in rebuttal. 
Court took the matter under advisement, informing counsel it would render a 
written decision. 
Court recessed at  2:17 P.M. 
APPROVED BY: 
$17 
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1 OPINION ON APPEAL 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN KIRCHER, 1 
This case is on appeal from the Magistrate Division of Clearwater County, the 
Honorable Randall W. Robinson presiding. Oral argument was heard June 6,2007 
Carry W. Jones, of the law firm Jones, Brower and Callery, argued on behalf of the 
Appellant, Kelly A. Dunagan Kircher (Kircher). Paul Thomas Clark, of the law firm 
Clark and Feeney, argued on behalf of the Respondent, Chris M. Dunagan (Dunagan) 
I. BACKGROUND 
Shortly after their marriage on May 27,2000, Kircher and Dunagan purchased 
the Krystal Caf6, a business Kircher had been operating prior to the marriage. The 
couple also purchased the real property on which the business was located. They then 
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sold a portion of the unrelated real property a short time later. After purchasing the 
cafe, the building underwent extensive renovations, finally reopening in October 2001. 
On November 24,2003, residential property which had been owned by Kircher 
prior to the marriage was refinanced through Zions Bank. As a condition of the 
refinancing, Kircher quitclaimed her interest in her home to "Kelly Dunagan and Chris 
Dunagan, wife and husband." Zions Bank subsequently recorded the deed with the 
Clearwater County Recorder. At trial, Kircher testified that she signed lots of papers at 
the closing and did not know that she was giving up any interest in her home to 
Dunagan. She also testified that she would not have signed the conveyance had she 
understood she was transferring an interest in her property to Dunagan. Dunagan 
objected to Kircher's testimony on the grounds that it violated the parol evidence rule. 
The Magistrate Judge initially overruled Dunagan's objection, allowing Kircher's 
testimony. However, in his Memorandum Opinion and Decision, Judge Robinson 
ultimately rejected Kircher's testimony because it violated the parol evidence rule. 
(Memorandum Opinion and Decision, 16). 
According to Kircher, at the time the couple married, they orally agreed to keep 
their finances separate. During their marriage, Dunagan and Kircher in fact kept their 
finances separate. Kircher paid all insurance and other payments on the house and on 
the Krystal Cafe. Dunagan gave Kircher $500 on two occasions. At triaI, Dunagan 
objected to Kircher's testimony regarding this separation of finances on the grounds 
that it violated the statute of frauds. The trial court and the parties subsequently 
engaged in a colloquy regarding the issue. Ultimately, Dunagan's objection was 
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sustained; however, counsel for Kircher was allowed to elicit the testimony for 
purposes of attempting to establish a compelling reason for an unequal distribution of 
community property. In his Memorandum Opinion and Decision, Judge Robinson held 
that evidence of the oral antenuptial agreement was not admissible under Idaho law, 
and that even if it were admissible, it failed to establish a compelling circumstance for 
warranting an unequal distribution of community property. , 
Dunagan and Kircher separated in 2005 and obtained a divorce on March 23, 
2006. On June 20,2006, a trial was conducted to determine the distribution of property 
and debt. The trial resulted in Judge Robinson determining an equal disposition of the 
community property was appropriate. Following an accounting and division of the 
marital assets, the trial judge ordered Kircher to pay Dunagan an equalization sum of 
$108,500. Additionally, the court held the transfer of Dunagan's interest in the Krystal 
Cafe to Kircher was predicated upon the equalization payment. The judge gave Kircher 
sixty days to make the payment or the building would be sold and the proceeds divided 
equally, as there was no other property that could be sold to achieve a substantially 
equal distribution of the community property. 
Kircher appealed Judge Robinson's decision, raising the following issues: 
1) Whether the court made a mistake of law in ruling that evidence of an oral 
antenuptial agreement did not constitute a compelling circumstance for 
ordering an unequal disposition of the community property; 
2) Whether the court abused its discretion by ruling that the circumstances 
surrounding the marital home were not a compelling reason to order an 
unequal disposition of the community property; 
3) Whether the court abused its discretion in the disposition of the Krystal Caf6; 
and, 
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4) Whether the court achieved "substantial equality" in the disposition of the 
community property. 
On cross-appeal, Dunagan raised one issue concerning the value of a flatbed trailer. 
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When acting in the capacity of an appellate court, the district court reviews 
appeals from the magistrate court according to the same scope and standard of review 
as the Supreme Court reviews appeals from the district court. I.R.C.P. 83(U)(1). The 
standard of review varies depending upon whether the issue presented is one of law, of 
fact, or of discretion. The Magistrate Judge's legal conclusions are subject to free 
review. Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373,146 P.2d 639,644. The Magistrate Judge's 
findings of fact are reviewed to determine if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Henteges v. Henteges, 125 Idaho 192,194,765 P.2d 1094,1096 (Ct. 
App. 1988). Finally, questions of discretion are reviewed to determine if the trial court's 
decision was within his discretion, consistent with applicable legal standards, and 
reached through the exercise of reason. Id. This Court will uphold the Magistrate 
Judge's decision as long as it is supported by substantial and competent evidence and 
the Magistrate Judge correctly applied sound legal principles to those facts. Id. 
111. DISCUSSION 
A. Oral Antenuptial Agreement 
The first issue raised by Kircher involves an antenuptial agreement. I.C. 5 32- 
712(1)@)(2). Klrcher argues that Judge Robinson erred as a matter of law by failing to 
consider the purported oral antenuptial agreement between herself and Dunagan, to 
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keep their finances separate. Kircher, on one hand, concedes that statutory law in Idaho 
requires a contract for a "marriage settlement" to be in writing. See 1.C. 5 32-917. While 
conceding that point, Kixcher argues for a change in the law. Kircher asks this Court to 
create an exception for oral marital contracts, which are supported by part performance, 
similar to ihe exception widely recognized for real property. See jolley v. Clay, 103 Idaho 
171,177,646 P.2d 413,419 (1982). Kircher cites California, Washington, and Colorado 
case law to the effect that each state has created a part performance exception to the 
statute of frauds in this context. 
Idaho courts, however, have remained firm in holding that to be enforceable, 
premarital agreements must be in writing. See Stevens v. Stevens, 135 Idaho 224,16 P.3d 
900 (2000). In light of the great weight of Idaho authority, this Court holds that a 
marriage settlement must be in writing and consequently, no part performance 
exception exists. Thus, the Magistrate Judge's refusal to consider evidence concerning 
the oral antenuptial agreement was a correct application of Idaho law and Judge 
Robinson's holding should be affirmed in this regard. 
B. Marital Home 
The second issue raised by Kircher is whether the Judge's refusal to consider 
evidence surrounding the marital home constituted an abuse of discretion. It must be 
remembered that at the time Kircher refinanced the marital home she quitclaimed the 
property to herself and Dunagan. At trial, in an attempt to render the transmutation of 
the marital home ineffective, Kircher testified that she did not realize she was 
transferring an  interest in her house to Dunagan when she quitclaimed an interest to 
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him. She also testified that had she known, she would not have signed the deed. The 
Magistrate Judge rejected Kircher's testimony because it was in violation of the parol 
evidence rule. As a result, Judge Robinson considered the house to be community 
property and divided its value equally. 
On appeal, Kircher does not argue the admissibility of her testimony as it applies 
to the effectiveness of the deed. Instead, she argues that the Magistrate Judge could 
have considered the evidence as proof of the hardship she will endure as a result of an 
equal disposition of the community property. She argues that the list of factors in I.C. § 
32-712(1)(b) is not exhaustive and that it was within the Judge Robinson's discretion to 
consider more evidence to determine whether a hardship would result from an equal 
disposition of the community property, 
Although the statute states that the list of factors is non-exhaustive, the majority 
of cases where the trial court has allowed an unequal division have discussed hardship 
in the context of LC. 5 32-712. See e.g. Hentges, 115 Idaho at 195,765 P.2d at 1097. An 
unequal division was affirmed in Hentges because the husband was paralyzed, 
unemployable, and in need of extensive medical care. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
recognized the important factors in the case were, inter alia, the health and 
employability of each spouse, the amount and source of each party's income, the needs 
of each spouse, and his or her potential earning capabilities. The decision to allow an  
unequal disposition was upheld because, "[the Magistrate's] decision was consistent 
with the factors set forth in I.C. 32-712.. ." Id. at 196,765 P.2d at 1098. Furthermore, the 
purpose of I.C. 3 32-712 is, in part, to set guidelines and boundaries for the Magistrate 
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Judge to follow in making the "threshold decision" between equal and unequal division 
of community property. See Donndelinger, 107 Idaho at 435,690 P.2d at 370. 
This Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion in 
rejecting Kircher's testimony. Kircher attempted to present the evidence at trial in an 
effort to invalidate the quitclaim deed. The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to 
preserve the integrity of written documents. Miller Const. Co. v. Stresstek, a Div. of L.R. 
Yegge, Co., 108 Idaho 187,190,697 P.2d 1201,1204 (Ct. App. 1985). The testimony was 
excluded because it was sought to set aside a valid deed. Kircher has failed to explain 
how evidence, which is rejected because of the parol evidence rule, would become 
admissible when offered for a different purpose. Although Kircher argues that the 
testimony was evidence of a hardship, unlike the husband in Hentges, she fails to 
explain her hardship in the context of I.C. § 32-712. The Magistrate Judge's decision to 
exclude evidence regarding the transmutation of the marital home was within his 
discretion, consistent with applicable legal standards, and reached through the exercise 
of reason. Consequently, that decision will not be set aside. 
C. Disposition of Krystal Caf6 
Kircher next argues Judge Robimson abused his discretion regarding the Krystal 
Caf6 in two ways. First, she contends, Judge Robimson failed to follow any of the 
guidelines set forth by LC. 5 32-713, which govern the disposition of real property. 
Second, she maintains the judge should have based the equalization sum on the actual 
sale price, rather than on the fair market value established at trial. 
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The guidelines set forth by I.C. 5 32-713 afford the trial court the option of: (1) 
awarding the property to one party with a corresponding award of value of property to 
the other; (2) ordering the property sold and dividing the proceeds equally between the 
parties; or (3) ordering the pr'operty partitioned between the parties. Larson v. Larson, 
139 Idaho 970,972,88 P.3d 1210,1212. In addition, "in appropriate circumstances, the 
trial court can also award property to one spouse and order the other to make payments 
over a reasonable period of time to equalize the division." Id. 
Judge Robinson's order awards the Krystal Caf6 to Kircher if she makes an 
equalization payment of $108,500 within six months. If payment is not made within six 
months, the building is to be sold and the proceeds divided equally. On appeal Kircher 
argues that the judge's disposition constitutes an abuse of discretion because it does not 
award Kircher the building outright, which she argues is required under the first option 
of LC. 5 32-713. Further, Kircher contends the second option was not followed because 
if the building is sold, the proceeds cannot be divided equally given that the debt 
associated with the building was also assigned to Kircher. Thus, she contends, the trial 
judge abused his discretion because he exercised none of the options available to him 
under Idaho Code § 32-713. 
Kircher's argument, however, ignores the fourth option available under Larson, 
that the trial court can award property to one spouse and order payments made over a 
reasonable period of time to equalize the division. See also Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 
860 P.2d 634 (1993). At its root, Kircher's real objection is to the value established for 
the property by the judge. However, Dunagan's real estate expert was essentially 
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uncontradicted in his valuation, unless one considers the testimony of Kircher, who is 
neither an expert nor unbiased. While this Court might have decided this case 
differently, that is clearly not the standard of review to be applied. 
The second reason Kircher attacks Judge Robinson's decision regarding the 
disposition of the Krystal Cafe is because she believes the judge failed to exercise 
discretion in basing the equalization sum on the fair market value rather than the sale 
price. Kircher points to the following language from the judge's opinion as the basis for 
her argument: 
The Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives both the Defendant and the 
Plaintiff an equal stake in the sale. Despite such appeal, I deny Defendant's 
request. 
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at the time of the Decree 
based upon the fair market value of the property at the time of the divorce. 
Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596,600,21 P.3d 918 (2001). As noted by the 
Supreme Court, "Any community asset may change in value after the division of 
the community. This is not a reason to modify the division." Ross v. Ross, 117 
Idaho 548,554,789 P.2d 1139 (1990). The Plaintiff should not be penalized by the 
Defendant's actioits while controlling use of the building or by the vagaries of 
the market. By fixing the equalization payment, this Court is removed from 
becoming intimately involved with the Plaintiff's actions or inactions in 
controlling the building since the date the value was established. Also, the 
Defendant has alternatives to selling the Cafe such as by selling her own home 
and/or by loans. 
Order to Amend Decree ofDivorce, pg. 2-3. Kircher argues this language somehow 
suggests Judge Robinson felt bound to base the equalization payment on the market 
value of the caf6 rather than its selling price. The first problem with this argument is 
that it assumes Kircher will sell the building. The judge clearly wanted the person 
controlling the asset to bear the risk of market changes. It was reasonable to assume 
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Kircher would keep the building so she could continue running her business. Such a 
decision could have delayed the equalization payment indefinitely. While it may be 
possible for a judge to retain jurisdiction, doing so is contrary to established policy 
favoring finality in judgments. The amended decree suggests the judge consciously 
exercised his discretion in favor of finality and chose to determine the value of the caf6 
at the time of trial, rather than becoming, as he put it "intimately involved with the 
Plaintiff's actions." Id. Thus, the judge's decision was within his discretion, consistent 
with applicable legal standards, and reached through the exercise of reason. AS a 
result, it should not be set aside. 
D. Substantial Equality 
The next issue brought by Kircher's appeal is whether the judge arrived at a 
substantially equal division of the community property. This is a factual question. As 
noted, factual questions will not be disturbed if they are based on substantial evidence. 
In a case such as this, the judge must divide the community property equally 
unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. Larson, 139 Idaho at 972,88 P.3d at 
1212. Although a judge may choose an equal division, the law does not require a 
mathematically equal division, nor is such a division likely to be achieved. Shepard V. 
Shepard, 94 Idaho 734,735,497 P.2d 321,322 (1972). The goal, rather, is to achieve a 
division that is substantially equal in value. Ross v. Ross, 117 Idaho 548,554,789 P.2d 
1139,1145 (1990). 
Kircher argues that because the trial judge ordered the equalization sum to be 
based upon the fair market value of the Krystal Cafi!, as opposed to the eventual sale 
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price, it cannot be determined whether the division was truly equal. She argues the 
division will only be equal if the Krystal Cafe sells for $236,500, the fair market value of 
the caM determined at trial. She concludes that the building will likely sell for much 
less, rendering the division unequal. Her argument is unavailing. As noted, the only 
expert testimony elicited at trial set the value of the cafi at $236,500. To the extent 
Kircher disputes the trial judge's conclusions, she is in reality in disagreement with the 
proof presented at trial. This is not a valid basis for this Court to disturb the trial 
judge's decision. Furthermore, in the interest of finality and certainty, the Magistrate 
Judge is not requirbd to achieve an exactly equal division, rather he is only required to 
substantially approximate an equal division, A review of the record reveals that the 
Magistrate Judge did just that. He heard testimony from each side, he weighed that 
testimony and he made a decision, based on substantial evidence, that approximates ail 
equal division of the community property. 
E. Value of Flatbed Trailer 
Finally, it is clear from the record, and the parties agree, that Judge Robinson 
erred in calculating the value of a flatbed trailer. The trailer was valued by the parties 
at $600. However, the decree of divorce listed the value as $6,000. This appears to be a 
simple typographical error. On this issue and this issue alone, the decision of the trial 
judge is reversed and remanded to correct this error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate Judge's decision is AFFIRMED in its entirety with the exception 
of the value of Dunagan's flatbed trailer. The case is REMANDGD to Judge Robinson 
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for a recalculation of the distribution of the community proper9 of the parties based on 
the changed value of the flatbed trailer. 
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KELLY A. DUNAGAN, ) 
Appellant. 1 
) 
TO: CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, the above named respondent; and 
TO: PAUL THOMAS CLARK, attorney for the above-named respondent; and 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1.  The above named appellant, KELLY A. DUNAGAN, appeals against the above 
named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion on Appeal entered in the above- 
entitled action on the 26' day of July, 2007, Honorable Judge John R Stegner presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
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2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 l(a)(2) I.A.R. 
3. The issues on appeal are: 
a. Whether the Court erred in determining that the appellant 
transmuted her home from her separate property to community 
propew. 
b. Whether the Court erred in failing to award an unequal distribution 
of property in favor of the appellant. 
c. Whether the Court erred in requiring the appellant to continue to 
be responsible for the condition of property ordered by the Court 
lo be sold and further requiring the appellant to be responsible for 
paying all expenses associated with the property such as water, 
sewer, garbage, power and loan payments. 
d. Whether the Court erred in failing to reallocate sale proceeds from 
the sale of the Krystal Kafe building in the event the sale price of 
said building is less than the $196,906.36 equity contemplated by 
the Cow. 
e. Whether the Court erred in failing to find the existence of an 
agreement between the parties that they would keep all of their 
respective property acquired prior to marriage, as their sole and 
separate property during their marriage. 
f. Such others issues which may he raised by appellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
4. No orders have been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. The appellants request the preparation of the entire reporter's standard transcript as 
defined in Rule 25(a), I.A.R. 
6 .  The appellant requests the Clerk's record be prepared as automatically included 
under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
7. 1 certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has 
been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
4 
DATED this 2 day of August, 2007. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
Attorney f u e l l a n t  
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I IEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was, this &bay of August, 2007, 
- hand-delivered by providing a 
copy to: Valley Messenger Service; 
hand-delivered; 
mailed, postage pre-paid, 
by first class mail; or 
- transmitted via facsimile 
TO (208) 746-91 60 
to: 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
THE TRAIN STATION, SUITE 20 1 
13TH & MAEV STREETS 
P.O. DRAWER 285 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
Attorney f ~ p p e i l a n t  
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, ) CASE NO. CV2005-00324 
1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) DOCKET NO. #34516 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Vs . ) OF EXHIBITS 






I, ROBjN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk ofthe District County of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of lodged document which are being forwarded to the 
Supreme Court as Exhibits in this cause: 
EXHIBITS: See Exhibit List filed 10/29/07 
LODGED DOCUMENTS: 
Transcript of a Court Trial on June lgth and 2oth, 2006. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal this 
day of October, 2007. &? 
- ' J J  
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Date: 10/29/2007 
Time: 10: !M 
Page 1 of 2 
Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
Exhibit Summary 
Case: CV-2005-0000324 
Chris M Dunagan vs. Kelly A Dunagan 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
User SUE 
Destroy 
Storage Location Notification Destroy or 
Number Description Result Property Item Number Date Return bate 
1 1 - Property value and debt list, Admitted Court file 
distribution summary. 
2 - 2001 tax return 
3 - 2002 tax return. 
6 - 2005 Tax return 
8 - Answer to Plaintiffs 1 st set of 
interogatories. 
10 - PurchaselSale agreement. 
11 - Loan documents. 
12 - Restricted use report 
13 -Appraisal report by Carmen 
Cody 
14 - 2005 Tax return of 
Christopher Dunagan. 
15 - Residential loan application. 
16 -Tax asset detail. 
23 - Defendant's bank statement. 
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court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas. 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark. Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Clark, Paul Thomas 
court file 
Jones, Garry W 
Date: 10/29/2007 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
Time 10 .M 




Chris M Dunagan vs. Kelly A Dunagan 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
User SUE 
Destroy 
Storage Location Notification Destrov or 
Result Property Item Number Date Return bate 
15 B - Chronological bank 
statements 
Admitted court file 
Assigned to: Jones, Garry W 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, ) CASE NO. CV2005-00324 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) DOCKET NO. #34516 
vs  . 
KELLY A. DUNAGAN, 
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I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of ldaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that 
the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleading and 
documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that all documents lodged, including briefs, in the above entitled 
cause will be duly lodged as Exhibits with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, along with 
the Court Reporter's Transcript, if requested, and Clerk's Record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I h ve hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Orofino, Idaho this 2 $hay of October, 2007. 
HRISTENSEN 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
CHRIS M. DUNAGAN, ) CASE NO. CV2005-00324 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) DOCKET NO. #34516 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
vs. 1 
) 





I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that 
I have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript, if a transcript was requested, to each of 
the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
Garry W. Jones Paul T. Clark 
Jones, Brower & Callery Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Box 854 P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 Lewiston, ID 83501 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal of the said Court this 23 * day of October, 2007. 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
